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·. 'EEC/USA,.• J.!ONETARY RE LAT IONS 
. . . ' . ' ' 
•; . 
·· .. 
The aoniina~~ iactor in the-monetary relations.between 
• -.: ;t,,:. ·- \ 
· .• the Com1il~ity. and. the United States has .been the reform of 
. . . . . . . ' ' ~ ,. ~. . . . . ' . ' 
': :, the ~ternational 'monetary sy~tem' agains_t ;a' background· of.· 
. . . . . 
. -: : .tie,1:i'vy'_ a:c;11ar 'fluctuations in the exchange. markets.-
' •... • ,.' -~; ---~• C • ; ,•,, .- ' ) .:. _,; ·~· ,• 
:, • , . ~. ... ~~.~ •' ' ./- .·;. .. • .: ' _; :-"' '' . • : \ • , . ,;! , . ' .' . . ·,. • .. • ' • . . . ·•. . • - ' 
· · ~:·· Since 1978, ·when· the· creation of a European monetary. 
... - • J' • .· ' • ' ' ·. • , -
·· · system :(EMS) wa~r first mooted ,and after its introduction ·: 
. ... . . •. ·'J - ~ . .•. . . . • . . . - . • ' ' ' 
. -· in March ··1979, :monetary: :relations between the Community·_and 
the ti~it~d:st'~tes h~ve ~e~ marked. by_~ ~ertttin -amount of 
tension, which ~was further <aggravated by the downward slide 
of the Ameripan. cur~enc.v in 0ct~ber 191a:ana in 1919. 
. .... -· ,·.... . . 
• • ._::.,• C 
I. FACTORS IN THE 'INTERNATIONAL MONETARY CRISIS 
. . , . ..._ 
l. 
,. ,· . \ '. 
'-... :. ·', ·:·' 
: ~· ' ,• '.-
., , 
The monetary system. set up at the end of ~ha_ waryby: 
· the .BRETTOI§ W6oDS agreement _came. to an end .on 15 August 1971 · : 
. . ; ._ . ' · .. ' :. ~ . . . . . < ,.· ' -' ' . ._ .. ·. .. . . . ·. . ·. . . 
whe'n:·Pr.eaident .. Nixon suspenqed. the..· convertibility of the 
· i. dollar>;,.• P!fteen. ye'ar~-·\if nta;~ed ~ris~~ and gathering clouds .·. 
preceded 'the de,ath of 'tlle _·oia' inter~at,io~al monetary. sys'tem. 
But the Bret.ton· Woods system,.· which was ba·a·ed o~ ~on~E!tt:i.bility 
. of the_. ·dollar into: gold, fixed 'parities arid international mone-
.' . '• , .. -. 
tary 'cooperation was ~?t 'to disappear officially until the 
. . 
adoption of'the new Articles of·the International Monetary 
.· - . , .. , - . 
Fund (IMF) in September 1976. 
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.. . . ·; · ·,_.-· The' crisis:·was/primarily,··'.the _re·suJ_t. of ):he:·growing 
_,.. ' : • ' ' • - .. • < • • • • • • ' ' ~ ".,, 
defrcit in the A~rican balance i,f payments·.-, a ·deficit which· 
. ·: wa's. gradually errid.ing t~e doll~;~ ~~d in: 1968 ·unleashed ~n. ,_.; , 
i:-~ :ova.rt· \<lorld, moneta~y ~:risi$: in· that yeai the Uriite.d States_.::·:: · • 
. ... '.~bolished ·gold co~;e;tibility ~f' the dollar for 'pri~a-te' ,t,;: . . 
·. . .- . - ' ,' ' . . . 
lndividuals.' . The de'··facto incon·;~rtibil.ity of'_.the· currency 
. . .: : _: .. :.··: .---':/·: ·.·.. : . _,, . , ,',:. . . - .. ·- _: .. ·· ' 
was made. official 'in .1971, when. it wa·s, applied to· central. 
: banks a~ ~'ii. ·.· Despi'te ;the wa~hington agreement~. of December· 
. · 1971 comprising :a ·g~~~ral r~alignment :~f exchange rates,· and · 
"··not~~ly ·a dec'rea~e·::in the ;dollar~ a gold parity,· 'conf,idence 
. -i~ the; int~r~atio;~l n1on~tary, arrangement~ ··was' .not r~st~red: 
· and the dollar \i'a·s ·:oi~e 'm~re devalued in, February.1973.<. . 
I .; ' . -,~ .. ' ;.; ·. •• . ' ' .:; , -, ,/::,.,l • •'' ' "''. <, ', ,• ,1. .,:, I ,' ·~·:. :·, , ' _. . t·· • . 
strong spa~;ati;e ·tnovements; which had already .forced 
major exchange rate,modifiba~ibns wor most.cur~encies.in 
' 1973~. hav~ _beeri s~eping th~·· exch~nge markets at more or 
. ,J.ess· regular' intervals e;er since. 
- The'break.:..down'of the· Drett~n Woods ro~neta.ry··system ': .. 
.. ·. was :also due to: t~~··_rion-functioni~9 of the parity adjustn:~nt . 
i' ,, ,• : pro~es·s. .· On. the ;one hand th~ United States had too long,' 
:'-~e-nia.i.rie:d ,iri--f~ndamental 'deficit while the Ad~i~itJtrati~n 
refused t~· devalue. tlie'. curre~cy1 this pol'licy • ·which experts 
, , \ ... ::'.', , hac1. c;:o~de~~ed .. si~ce'. the early 19.60s, could only be· ~~sued. 
::':_', .. · .. ' ~: .;, ' thr~gh ~utomatic fi~ancing of ·.the defi~it, ~ade possible 
> ·,, 
'- .. ~ 
: I ( 
•,· 
I A ~ •'' ' ' , • 
''by th~ dollar's .role as a. resetve currency. , On the other 
. hand. certain countries with balance of payments' surpluses. 
•refu~~d· t·~ · ackn~ledg~ the a~preciation of thei; currency 
while they strove _to neutralize the monetary effects of their ' 
· s·ui' plui . pc;s i ti~ti. ·., .· The · Br~tton·,:· tioods system, · 'therefore, . 
~uccun~ed to the· rigor mortis of an excessively x:igid parity,··. 
·. adjustment process. : 
- After 1973 the pendulum gradually swung to the -~pposite 
. extreire and stuck there~ Generalized floating has become the·. 
- ~ -
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. -~, pr-incipaf ~haract~ristic -c,f .the world lltOnetary 'non-syst~m• since· 
: :·: 1971 : .. : It' :is a-:· I non-sy~'tem• '~'1hich, . si~ce. the .ado~tion. o'f t~ 
· \. · ·_· d~~ft .. 6f' .th~ second.: arr.end·me~t'J o/ the Article's o{''.Agreeinent . 
' •, ; . ' ' . ' .· ... ; '·, . ' . . . ' . ~ . . . ' : , ' , . . . - . ' . 
~. ~. " 
. :\. ·~ 
of the I:MF·inl976. in.Jamaica, .operates on the.following 
f~ur.O'p;i~~~pl~-~ :_._J :; ·:-_:· · ':\ · · ; ~:>: ·· . 
. !' 
' ~.. , . 
,(1) ·· si~68 overall flexibility of. exchange rntes is 
:~.-..a. dangerous. illusiqn which must be dispelled;,· 
· · the new provisions .in· the Articles do not 
· .. constitute.a· legal:basis for perm~nently :floating 
· ·exch9~9e ·~at~st :: _' :: 
~ • >, ~ • • • • .. •• 
. . 
.· ' 
(2) the objective is:to·introduce a_system of·-
1 :,stable ·but adjustable exchange_ rates.· . All Fund .. 
::, members· should decide·: on an exchange :rate for 
. theif 'curre~cy\ind maintain that rate within the 
limits 9£ an }'lcceptable margin: 
. . . .. .. . . . 
(3) ·.'however,. a transition period is required to. 
prepare a satisfactory introduction of.the.new 
' ' . ·.. . ·'· . 
. . :. · .. ' system ~hich cannot· come 'into. force ·until the' ,, . 
... ·:,1 ••,,' • • ,• • I ,' ' ' - • ' T 
·. ·::., -~ · world economy. has recovered adequate _stability1 · 
'I . • .. , • • • .• • . • ~ - • . • . 
· . 
. . , 
(4) ;_ finaliy,· if 'an international monetary system is 
·., ... 
. _ to be 1:espected, 
. :. for the DlF. 
. 2 ~' ... ~!21.l!_!!!~~·!:~_22!~!: 
' this implies. increased ·powers .• 
. -
In 1945,. the dollar was all-powerful, .. convertible without 
difficulty in view of the_large stocks of gold built up by the 
. . . ,, '•. ,\ 
·United States,'it·was a11· the more sought.after because there 
wa·s wi~espread poverty and America alone: could suppiy the goods . 
necessary for the'. ~urvival and reconstruc~ion of countries 
ruined by the war. 
·At the same time, in consequence of the Bretton Woods 
decisions, the dollar was rapidly coming to dominate the 
world monetary system. 
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_In, contrast, the Euro~an countries emerged from · 
i,... --.. ~ • ' ·: •. 
the :1.-nir i~ 'a disastrous monetary state:'~ . incon~rtible and 
d~pre~iatin.g ~urrencies, ._inflation, shortage of :g~ld and-
~ \'_ ~-- ,> 
.•.:_., ··1· 
', _-
-currency. reserV'es force_d them to apply ex~han;e ~ontrols; .· · 
slowed down their recovery. and made them dependent on 
American aid. . , . 
. ~ .. -;'. ' . 
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' . Beginnj.ng··with 'the 1950s, _several factors combined to 
- ~ ' . -
. ' effec~· a tr~iisition .from a. world shortage ·of dollars to a . ' . 
. . . ., . . . 
-_.- 'gr~i.119 ablind~nce of. that: currency:. the rapid recovery of. ;_. 
• . •., <, ' . 
. .. :' the economies 'of Wester~ Europe and Japan, : the 1949 deva1.:..· 
) uatio~- ·of -m:~;i ,Eui:opeail_ ~urrencies with; respect to the doll~r, · 
---thtt -~ndeftak:tng.'by- the- Unl~ed State·s of:~-· huge ·p;og~ar.ime of . 
--~oreign economic' or milita'r·yaid' and the' fast growth of 
- . . . . ~ ' . ~ ,~ , 
private. inv~st.'ment: _. particula~ly of direct American· invest.:. 
. irents 'a~ro,d~~;:<,< :· <\; . 
~ . . ~ · .. 
- •• : . ~ . '. •. ·,:..· ... ,•• - .. . • - • ~ ·,., ~ : ;- ·: . • .~ -~ ·) . • : . • ? ., 
, __ . ThEvAnietican BOP. defic~t, which gave no cause £or concern 
--. in- the·. periocl i.950~1960,'''nciw be:~~~- to :po~~ a t~eat t.o. th~ .• -· 
·smooth'' f~~~tl~_rd~~ C?f; _th~-:}nt:ern~ti~nal ir.on~ta;y ~ys~em·. ·· 
' . . -, ··:.- . •. - .-. '.-,,· ... · ,· ·'""":· .~ " ' -
-Bet~-en· ':i9;6t> ·ina 1973 ·the ao11ar ~ri~is re.mained at the 
cen~~ ~f t:he.'mo~eta~y- .rei~tions· betweeri Euro~f and the United · 
-. Stat~s>: ~~pec~~lly a_;·:)~-~gilrd~ ~b~ . ~mber countries·. rif -the 
E~ro~~n t'c~nomi-~ C~mm{i~ity.:· :-The' ~entr~l ba~ks. of the~e 
. .· ••• ••. -.~--~ ,,·.~·-· ':.- ..... ;'-; --~·_,; .... ·._ •' \._ ·-·~ "-~·,,.·.·_-·,, ,'· ._, .... ' •.• ·.;_,. .. ·. ' _; '<-; .:., . . · '~-,·· . • ' 
:<· countr,ies -_ were ·:accumulating increasing: doll.a. 'reserves as 'the. 
-:. Unite~·:;S~ates.·continuE!d .. to make''.~~~si;~?dir~c~ i;n~etn:e~t~- in . 
.. , .. •,-' 
the Co~on· Market~ ··: Most' of th~/se countries/ nevertheless. . 
sup~tea· t~ _Ame-~.ica~: vi~w· th_~t _tlie- .. off icia1 ·ao1tar parity, 
.. . ... ' . .,.. . ' .. ' .. 
the 'pivot·.of .the 'inte:rriational mc,neta.ry. system.was . s~crosanct • 
.. Divergencies iri· views and· 
0
polic.ies betwe~n France and its 
. r~maining Common Market-_ part11ers t~oughout this period affected 
the. developme1?:t of the colllmUnit~. and. es~cially any initiative 
to set up monetary cooperation _a~ong the .Member States. To 
;.-,. many·,, any such initiative seemed like a· more or less· veiled · 
:· . 'd~clar~tion "of. war against the. doll~r. --. ~nstead- of acting _--' 
together, th~ Co~~n Market countries c~~fined themselves ~more 
or less uncoordinated measures and it was not until the dramatic 
- '·•, "{ 
·t -
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! .-. . • • 
events of Augus_t· 1971. th~t 'they m.:"lnaged ·to achieve a 
•. 
'common po~ition for the _negotiations leading to .the . , . 
: · Smithsonia~ Agre~men·t, · and that ·they ·made the. first steps • 
..•. · : ·. towards . ordering.' intra-co~;~nitY: monetary relation~.- . ' 
: . ~. ·~' . . ;· . . . . . . ... 
. · o~· 11 March 197:3, · six European Community roemh-er countries 
. <lecided to .float their'. currenc1es togeth~r and to St.op· mzi.1n~ . 
. · . tai11ing' their doljar. ~xch~nge rates. . ' . · . 
_,, 
\. : The. ~-ollar~·· ~ince 1971, ·has· suffered repeated exchange 
·fluctuationsana since 1978 it. has been sliding so severely 
. \th~t .fear~ ha.d been. expressed ,of. the approach; ~f. a world. '; 
:/ -";- . ' . ' . . ·, 
. ~-onetary and economic 'crisis a; serious as that 'of 19~:9~ .. · 
:tn- the ;a~~' of this• ·aeteriorating 'i~~er~~tional monetary 
. ,. ' . • .: I . ., . '• . . 
. $ituation,. and especially of the congenital t>J"eakness of. the 
' . ' . ' ' . ~ : . ,. ' . . .-. . 
. internationaf' currency -represented by the . dollar, the Euro_pean . 
E~on~ic Community·.'attempted a numbe~ of, . mostly ·unsuccess_ful, ·. 
'·~asuies· between 1971 and i 978 bef~re. finally. ~etting up the; 
....... _'),. ·'.' .,.-·, .:.. ',,;, •; . . 
·•,. ; _ _-·<·.-E1<IS.in".1919;/ . ,. "·" ·,_ ... , 
. ... . 
> 
' " 
:-·-.. , "'·" .· . 
. . , ...... 
·II.· Tm: EUROFEAN POSITION :. . .' . , 
. . ~· ·.-.. ,/; .,,:, ./·::,. •' 
.... ·_. .':·. .· ' '· .. ~ :· .. - ;~ ·- _;?. ;. :. > •• :, • :·: ... : ~ -:: •• 
· '. · 1.. . ~2~~!l~!!~~~!~~-!!!.:.~~ee_i~!2!!~tti!~~!!~~!!;..~~E~!;~~! .. 
. ·;:-. ·: ;· • • _<!. .-~ • 
·.·-···:.,.; 
Th~s period can be.isuhdivided ·111.tc{the ·stages· of infancy; . 
· ... · \ - ·:·· 
. ~- ,·' 
•. '"':;·f.,· . -, ' .. • 
·.(a}.>, From'. tb~ signing of the .. Treaty of Rome to Th~. Hagee Conference 
' - ••• • • • ->. • ' 
(b) 
of· 1969. the" ,Eu~opean Econociic .·Community ma.de. virtually no 
progress in, its ;~ffort~ t;6 ,•coordinate. monetary matters. 
. ' . u . ' . . 
At the 1969 HageC<:>nference the Heads.of S~llte and of 
Government declared.for· the first·time that'they were 
resoluteiy in favour of the achievement in stages of 
an economic and monetary union. There was set up a 
co~itte~. of experts which was eventually to produce 
,,,,' ,,. • •: ' 'r 
the Werner plan: however, the crisis of May 1971 and 
Fr .-tm. -/m,. 
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'-.. the American .move.of .is:.Auguat of that.-'year,:wer~-
. ' ,. : ... ·. ,' ' . . ~.. ·, ' . . '• . ' . ' ' 
.:·· ' .. destined to delay .'t.11e .'i>~act!cal i~plementation; or.·. 
··. the provisi~ns i;,ropo~ed in:'the ~rner pla·n.and .of 
··(,the Council' decisions ~f March 191i:: . >: / . :..·_.: .·. -
'··"•, • • • .J • , •• .;' ·, .',\ ' • ' 
: .:-...: ~ 
.. ·. J\fter the Washington ,agreeroent a council resolution of 
·,)larch 1972 opened the -~y to narrowing the margins of .. 
. :fluctuations. between community currencies and to the . 
. '., estnbl~shment ·of a European .Monetary C~operation ·r~nd 
., •' •• ;:'' ;,·. • . .J • ::. (EMCF) • : .. ; • , .. ·' 
• ~ ·:' >~ '\", '\ ' . • . ·~ .-:·:,_: • _ .. ~. ... . • '. . ' ; .• •.•. ~,.,, 
f?';~ . ··'·,·- t~{ Thl·:period' of ·doubt.. The floati~g .. of· sterling 'and of. 
:·_'•:l} :',:· ·. ,-, -•.. -:the· ._-Italian, lua,. followed by that. of th~ French 'fra'n~~, 
· .. ·:··:~.'.-_·,~.:--.·.:_:.;_·.~ ••. ·. ·_ •. _. .;:··:·!.,:·:········.·_·.:····.:··,-, .. ·:;;:·: ' .·· ... :~de th~ ·-~onduct ol t};le Common Agricu.itural Policy ' . 
_ · . : ·: .. , .iri~reas°ingly compl~x •. :· 'Wh~t ·i~ m~re, differences of 
~ •,I, ' ••, ' > • - 0 ,• • 0 , • C O ' 
. _;, ': ... attitude's ·to' 'international tnonetary '·problems began to. 
'_~ij'f·~ ~ ~, . ' ,, ~- ·;· ' .- . -~-· ' . .· . . . . . . 
. ,:;'. . ' ,_:: ::::appear ~mong "the Corr:tnunity ff.ember Sti:tt~s •....• 
< • • • <, • . ··,, •. ;, ' 
l •••• •· ·~.~ ·~' • ;:<: ,·· . . ; . ·· ... _. ~\.~-~ 
,-· • n > • ;,.' : ~'·1 • I•< : ,:, ~' -..'' ' •' :· ' - ... • '\ • ' < ' • ~ ' ' • '.' 
,. _ On~·the question of. the future. exchange rate system, there· 
.. ·_: ·; wer~, ~aa.{ij~n~l diff~r~Iices · of attitude among .the' :Memb~r State'·s·, 
's~~- oi~i-rig~·. with.-~b~ -U~ited. stat~s, for flexibility, oth~r~·-
.... : '' - ... -~:."' ·. 't.. ~ ,. ' : ·. • • ,' ;, . . • ,-: ,,, . :· .-;..: • ' ' .. . ' • .·,. ::_--- . 
. · for !ixed -parities .. ~- They al,so could not;,agree on the ·rple ·of 
• : - ,' ... I ', • ,; • • • ·~ .;, ,, V :' : ' • 1,- ' ,a.~· ' 
. · gold e.nd on the choice· between. a unified. world mbrietary system 
,.,.:~ .. ·• ·,-· -::·.-·: .?: .· ·.'·'.:· ~ .,'·' ,''·~~.:'..;'. ··,·.~ ·.· '., .. _':"r '._ .. , .. ·.__·· ; •. .-.• ~·;,, . 
: ' .• / ·,: .< .·· and ,,a,. ll\Ulti-polar ;one.; : , · ._ ·.: . , .... · _ :. , 
," ,· :, ";.:_'..:·. ' • ,. l ',:,.:, • •• k.:~' 'j', ·,, ·:· .; ·/_.~:-. ' ' .... ,·, · .. ",:.,.,.. • • 
. ' 'J.: ~~,,., ; ' ' ·.·,>: ·•· .. · J ~. 
'· 
:\ . ·r , ... >- : <-<·. . ... ..,.:,~-.··.:;.· :> -~>~ .· .. -./~ .. - ~·· ·~.·· ~. ·\_·,. ·. -- . 
It. $hould _be rioted here that these con£ licts we_re : , 
att~rltu~t~d··after _!974~: and that 'sine~ that time 'the Com-. 
munity:countries:ha~e .tended tQ;Coordinate thei.J:acti~ities 
.... . , ' . ~ . . ·.· ' 
wi thi_n the· !MF and1 aft~r Kingston, have managed to defend 
. :. ", "' .. ,.,-·· : . 
their. common 'j;>osition vis~a-vis the Fund~ . 
.... ,,·, 
. ' . 
';, •'i.:' 
-----------··"': 
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' 2. The monetary .situation in Europe fro~ the !(ingeton ffi££!!~2 
----------------------------------------~-----------
to the creation of the EMS 
--------------------------
There have !)een a nurr:bcr of devclopmente: in the European 
monetary cituation Eince Kingston. '.rhe EtL'cope3n monetary 'E:nake' 
did become op:?r21tive, but it gr~du:illy chrank to a 'DM area'. 
In addition, a system of Community loans to finc.1nce oil dcficitro 
was introduced. 
'l1l!en, n new Europe.Jn unit of account (EUA) was created znd, 
a':>ove all, the economic and monetary union was relaunched \'.'ith the 
establishment of a EuropEEtn Monetary Sy!:tem (EMS) \-.;hich came into 
force in Mnrch 1979. 
3. 'l'he F.l\!S 
(a) The r~acon for the creation of the Euroosan Monetarv ~vstern 
'.Phlzhmamnin objective of the EMS is to create a zone of monetary 
st3bility in Europe and thus to p:comote economic growth and improve 
the employment situation in the Europeun Community. 'i'here is a 
good deal of misunders~1nding of this fundamentnl aim, particularly 
in the United 2tates, where there is a tendency to regard it as 
being directed against the dollar. 
!t r::eerns necessary, tt1ercfore, to clarify the real motives 
behind the creation of the European Monetary System: 
- the debatable motives: 
One of these is said to be the protection of Europe, with 
its trade and its economic interests, from the effects of the 
chaotic fluctuations of the dollar rate. On thi~ interpretation, 
widely di~cussed in the specialist press, especially in the Unib::d 
States, the EMS would represent a ~-ystern of defences set up by the 
European Economic Community. 
... 
- 8 -
The EMS L, neither a citadel to shield the Cotnmuni.ty from 
the er~atic movementE of the dollar, nor u b~ttering Lam aimed at 
the American currency. If the r:ui~opean currencie!:: overall gain 
in value with reEp-2ct to the dollar, thi.s does not protect the 
Com.~unity f:rom the deleterious effects of the Litter's depreciation, 
t\'iO of which ;:ire of major importnnce: the distrotion of competition 
to the bcncfi t of American producers, and a perpetual incentive 
to the producers of raw materials to raise their prices, which are 
e1:p.cessed in dollars, to compensate for the lZltte:r' r: f:::lling value. 
Nor can it be regarded as a weapon aimed at the dollar 
because, whatever the European monatarnyr.set-up, it mu£t fit into 
the wider framework of the international monetary f'ystem. 
! All thie means that if Europe failed to coordinate its policies 
with those of its partners, and especially of the United States, 
the existence of the EMS was likely to undermine further the 
position of the dollar. 
- the convincing motives: 
There are ttvo: the first is that fi}{ed exchange rates among 
the Community currencies will p?::-omote tho development of intra-
Cornmuni t:/ trade. tn an ,1i.7e.:1 of E"Uch dyn,~mic econor.1ic activity, 
where, thanks to the eliminntion of customs dutief' und non-tc1riff 
obstacle~ to trade, there is. somethin;r approaching optimum allocation 
of the factors of production, it is difficult to adjust to partty 
changes such as have occurred beb.\'.een the • sn,1ke' countries and 
Germany on the one hand and France and Italy on the other. 
is the principal reason behind the EMS. 
This 
The second, less obvious but no l~ss important, reason is 
undoubtedly the contribution which the EMS can maae to the ei::tab-
lishment of an orderly world economic system. 
The Jamaica agreements have in fact not filled the vacuum 
left by .the bre.:ik-up of the Bretton Hoods intern<ltional system. 
.. ~. 
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In a '\''ell-ordered world moneta:-y £Y:item it E"hould be possible. 
first of all, to effect payments across frontier.£ and secondly, but 
here lies the rub, there Ehould be a mechani5m for offsetting 
debtor and dreditor bu.lo.nci?.s which the countries concerned \·:ould be 
obli3cd to npply and \-,hich /et would not j eopurdize their freedom 
in inter-n:il policies. 
The \>:orld' s ~:d.x-year-old €}:periencc with flP;dble exchonge r 
rates shows that these do not meet either of the requirement~ for 
a satisfactory world monetary order. 
The second reason behind the E.MS, thecefore, is that through t 
the pragmatic evolution of effective and equitable rules for 
monetary behaviour between neighbouring countries linked by economic 
and cultural links, p:co:3rcE,s should be made towards creating n 
world monetary order. 
III. CURRENT SITUl\'rION 
1. American monctGry policy 
------------------------
American policy in the monetary field since 1969 has been 
marked by a series of stop-go mensures. Coupled with thnt 
country's policy on energy and the American anti-inflationary 
programme, these explain why the dollar's position has been so 
seriously shaken. 
Since 1 Novembel'." 1973, hcr,vevcr, the United States ccems to have 
found the right direction for itf: monetary policy. The mec1~ures 
announced by President Carter that day repre!:,ent a radical 1;win3 
away from earlier policieE: first, the United States decided to 
borrow not only from central banks but also in the private market 
and, ~.econdly, they accepted that these loans should no longer be 
denominated only in dollars, but also in the currency of the 
credm.ior country: li'.arks, s .. dss franc£, yens. These measures 
helped to restore calm to the world money markets for a period of 
si~, months. But it waE not to last. From June 1979, following 
the increase in oil prices and the announcement that inflation 
in the United States was getting worse, speculation ag:Jinst the 
.. 
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dollar increased, together witti its corolla~y, risfumg gold prices • 
On 6 October 1979, faced with .., .slumping dollar a.nd spiralling 
gold, the US Federal Resezwucnoard decided to introduce a new 
s0rics of measures: discount rate up from 11 to 12%, brmks required 
to create supplementary rcf~erves in pr.oportion to increased liabi-
lities (time deposits, Euro-dolla~ borr0v;ing, Federal State funds), 
and a ne\-J market intervention sti:.-ateqy in \·Jhich the Federal Reserve 
gives priority to controlling the money supply. 
The new l\me::-ican policy v:as welcomed by the r:uropcans, who 
were c;uick to note in it t:ie fir!'Et implicit recognition by the 
United states that the dollar's \Jeakneris is primarily due to 
internal causes, and \-,elcomed ti1e major switch in the philoEophy 
of the Federal ReEerve which for a long time before had made the 
control of short-term inte:i:est rates its princip.::1 objective. 
Now, control of the money supply t.:ikes pride of place r1nd 
interest rates will follow fluctuations in demand. In the last 
resort the effectiveness of these measures will depend on the 
resolve with which the American autho;:·ities are prepa.red to 
pmplement them. 
The fact that the Americ.::?ns nsw see the defence of their 
currency as the principal tuFk can only please the EuropAans who 
have no desire to go on supporting the dolla~ by themselves. 
Fears, hev:ever, are alre2.dy being e:{pressed that the new packRJe 
is likely to depress economic g~owth in the United Stntes, and 
therefore also in Europe. 
2.1 The EMS vis-a-vis the dollar 
----------------------------
· The tribula tiont= of the dollar in recent months have shown 
with increa~ing cL::rity thut the crisis of the American currency 
is also a Eu~opean problem. r,~ost of the dollar c1:ises put 
heavy pressures on European ~xchan~e markets, causing variations 
arnon9 the European currencies' exchange rates. In other words, 
--
f 
I 
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the dollar crises trigger off the consequences of a problem which 
is specifically European: the lack of adequate coordination 
among the various monetary authocities. 
Here we have a measure of the gravity of t11e situation in. 
\·:hich the European l•':onetary System finds itself. Unless there 
can be a Community policy vie-a-vis the dollar, the flight from 
that currency will create constant pressures on intra-European 
exchange rates:, and lead to the eventual collapEe of the EMS. 
The logic of rn .. "lintainin9· a limited stability of e~:change 
rates within Zi major geogcaphic,~!l .-1nd economic zone h~r: at la2t 
been recognised: such limited st::ibility cannot be maintained 
without intervention in respect of third currencies, not21bly the 
dollar and the yen. 
The Community member countries will thus have to set them-
selves target exchange rates for the dollar and the yen, and this 
major political decision will be a gauge of their desire for 
independence, but also of their willingness to cooperate with theitr 
two major partners, the United States and Japan. 
If the United States munaged to put its economic houEe in 
order, and so stabilize its currency, it will recreate the 
essential factor for a return to mutual confidence, a confidence 
~hich is a necessary condition for cooperation in monetary rnntters. 
If the Americans are successful in this endeavour, they hzwe 
nothing to fear from the existence of the EMS; 
3. The reform of the internation<1l monet..1.ry svstem between 
-----------------------~---------------~--~------------l978 and 1979 
-------------
1
.rhe floating of currencies which first took place in Harch 
1973 v:as officially .sanctioned when on 1 April 1978 the Second 
Amendment of the Articles of A9reerri.ent of the IMF, whereby the 
l-1ember States are free to choose their e:{change arrangements, 
came into force. On the other hand neither the commitment under-
taken by the countries concerned to abide by an 'orderly' and 
- J.2 -
'stable' system, nor the powers of surveillance over its members' 
exchange policies conferred on the :Puna'. have any real binding 
force. 
At each of the meetings of the IMF Interim Conunittee (in 
?-~e:dco at the end of April 1978 and in Washington at the end of 
September 1978) the Comrr.unity was able to present a joint position 
laid down by the Council after d:i.scussions in the Monetcry Corrn:nittee. 
Thus the decisions on the quota increases. the new allocation of 
SDRs and the enhanced statun of this instrument ·1;.;ith a view to its 
becoming a medium of international settlements. were all made with 
the support of the European Economic Community. 
Finally, at the I.MF annual meeting on 5 October 1979 in 
Belgrade, the Community took an active part in the dis:cussions 
preparatory to the creation of a • substitution. riccount' whereby 
dollars can be exchanged for special drawing rights (SDR). The 
Nine are. in principle, not oppos-ed to the idea of this mech;mism 
and they support the proposal that details of the provisions 
necessary to create thi.s •account' should be further studied. 
But the European authocities attach an.special importance to: 
- means of ensuring that assets denominated in SDRs offer 
attractive ymelds, 
the maintenance of their value and the sharing of the burden 
of possible losees, as well as the question of the redemption 
of liabilities on this account, 
to the transferability and the liquidity of these assets. 
By the terms of the agreement of 5 December 1978, the 
existence of the EMS is and remains totally compatible with the 
Articles of the I.MF. Nevertheless. the feet that third countries 
may join the system, the role conferred on the ECU qnd its proposed 
extension to become a means of payment, as well as the retention of 
gold as the medium of payment in intra-Community eettlements, 
already demarcate the EMS from the international monetary system. 
